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Abstract 
The utilization of visual evidence in the courtroom has increased exponentially in an 
effort to portray​ additional information that cannot otherwise be established via forensic 
evidence and expert testimony. ​According to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (1984), 
visual evidence ​may be permitted in court if the prejudicial value does not significantly outweigh 
the probative value. The admissibility of visual evidence however, becomes controversial when 
combined with victim impact statements (VIS) during the penalty phase of capital trials.  
Previous research has indicated that jurors are often unable to perceive emotional 
testimony and subsequently make objective sentencing decisions that are based on reason rather 
than emotion. Moreover, previous literature has demonstrated that emotionally charged visual 
evidence can significantly distort jurors’ memories of case facts depending on their desire for 
retribution. Despite these findings, previous literature has not empirically explored the combined 
effects of emotional testimony and visual evidence on juror memory distortion and sentencing 
decisions. 
The present study examined the combined effects of VIS and photographic evidence on 
juror memory distortion and sentencing decisions. Participants will be randomly assigned to 
three conditions and instructed to read identical murder trial transcripts and VIS during the 
penalty phase of a capital case. Participants were exposed to varying levels of emotionally 
charged photographs and instructed to subsequently sentence the defendant to either life in 
prison or to death. Participants’ memory recall and emotional states were evaluated. Implications 
are discussed.  
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Brace for Impact: The Effect of Victim Impact Evidence on Juror Memory Distortion 
 and Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials  
On May 27​th​, 1998 Joseph Lee Ard appeared before the South Carolina Supreme Court 
for the murder of his pregnant girlfriend, Madalyn Coffey, and their unborn child. According to 
the autopsy report, Ms. Coffey died from a single gunshot wound to the head, while her unborn 
(but viable) fetus survived the injury in utero for approximately six to eight minutes before 
suffocating to death (​State v. Ard​, 1998). The Court determined that the murder of a viable fetus 
qualified Ard for the death penalty in the state of South Carolina. During the sentencing phase, 
the solicitor motioned to present two photographs of the unborn child dressed in the clothes that 
Ms. Coffey had intended for him to wear on his way home from the hospital as aggravating 
evidence against the character of the defendant—a decision that was left solely to the judge’s 
discretion on relevance and probative/prejudicial value. Citing previous legislation in ​Payne v. 
Tennessee​ (1991), the judge deemed the photographs admissible. Without any judicial 
instruction on how to properly weigh this emotionally disturbing aggravating evidence, the jury 
sentenced Ard to death (​State v. Ard​, 1998). Would such an instruction have made any 
difference? That is what we consider here.  
Within the United States legal system, lawyers frequently capitalize on the opportunity to 
use graphic victim impact evidence such as photographs, videotapes, and victim impact 
statements (VIS) when attempting to persuade judges and jurors to convict a defendant and/or 
impose maximum sentences. According to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 2004), judges retain the authority to omit 
relevant evidence if its probative value significantly outweighs its prejudicial value.​ Probative 
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meaning that the visual evidence must serve as additional information that cannot be otherwise 
established via expert testimony; p​rejudicial meaning potential bias that may hinder objective 
legal decision-making (i.e., emotional influence, cognitive processing errors, etc.) and 
compromise due process and a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment (Bandes & Salerno, 
2014; Salerno, 2017). Victim impact evidence is currently introduced in a variety of criminal 
cases, however, capital juries are presented with this frequently highly prejudicial evidence. 
Importantly, there have been only futile efforts by the justice system to impose substantive 
limits, procedural controls, or guidance on how to evaluate such evidence when assessing the 
“deathworthiness” of a defendant (Douglas, Lyon & Ogloff; 1997; Logan, 1999). As a result of 
Rule 403, judges are therefore compelled to rely on their own discretion for how emotionally 
disturbing evidence may affect jurors’ decision-making—often contradicting previous 
psycholegal research on the effects of emotions and decision-making (Salerno, 2017).  
Victim Impact Statements 
Historically, crime victims were habitually disregarded by the criminal justice system; 
that is, until a new wave of legislative reform concerning victims’ rights emerged in the early 
1970s (Henderson, 1985; Logan, 1999; Myers & Green, 2004). As a result of this reform, 
victims’ advocates achieved extensive modifications in state and federal law—giving crime 
victims the opportunity to testify about the harm that they personally experienced as a 
consequence of the crime in both non capital and capital cases. These testimonies are termed, 
victim impact statements (VIS), which are now permitted in nearly every state in the U.S. 
(contingent on judges’ discretion; Davis & Smith, 1994b; Myers & Green, 2004). In fact, 26 out 
of the 31 states that enforce the death penalty permit VIS to be administered during the 
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sentencing phase of the trial (Death Penalty Information Center, 2015; Nuñez et al., 2017). 
Victim impact statements are a subsection of victim impact evidence (VIE), which encompasses 
evidence that may be presented by prosecutors during the sentencing phase of a trial (i.e., VIS, 
photographic evidence, videographic evidence, etc.). VIS allow the family members of the 
victim(s) to inform the judge and/or jury on the impact of the crime on their lives. Such 
statements can include, but is not limited to: identification of the offender; indications of 
financial losses suffered by the victim(s); lists of physical injuries suffered by the victim 
including seriousness and permanence; description of changes to the victim’s personal welfare or 
familial relationships; requests of psychological services for the victim or his/her family 
members; and miscellaneous information related to the impact of the offense on the victim or the 
victim’s family (Myers & Green, 2004).  
In 1982, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which requires the 
incorporation of VIS with the pre-sentence report that is proposed to the sentencing authority. 
Additionally, the Uniform Victims of Crime Act (1992) granted victims the constitutional right 
to attend court proceedings concerning their cases. Along with this legislative reform however, 
numerous opponents within the legal system have expressed concern—stating that victim impact 
evidence merely serves to foster the opportunity for jurors to construct their sentencing decisions 
based on emotion(s) and the victim(s)’ character rather than pertinent criminal 
circumstances/evidence (Platania & Berman, 2006). Furthermore, various legal scholars have 
vocalized their apprehensiveness towards the lack of uniformity that VIS introduce to sentencing 
proceedings. Legal experts maintain that victim impact statements do not address the essential 
needs of crime victims, but rather increase arbitrariness and may result in harsher treatment of 
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 7 
 
convicted offenders (American Bar Association, 1981; Davis & Smith, 1994). “At best, victim 
impact testimony provides a momentary opportunity for survivors to give voice to their loss, be 
heard, and feel less isolated. At worst, victim impact testimony exploits the immense pain 
suffered by survivors—using the emotional reaction to their circumstances as a lever to produce 
a death sentence, while leaving them as onlookers in a criminal justice process whose focus is 
punishing the offender, not meeting the needs of survivors” (Burr, 2003, p. 517).  
The landmark Supreme Court decision of ​Payne v. Tennessee​ (1991) was the first case 
that allowed the introduction of victim impact evidence in a capital sentence hearing (Platania & 
Berman, 2006). Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted by a jury on two counts of first-degree 
murder for stabbing his girlfriend, Charisse Christopher, and her 2-year-old daughter, Lacie, to 
death with a butcher knife. In addition, Payne was convicted of one count of assault with intent 
to commit murder of his girlfriend’s 3-year-old son, Nicholas, who survived his stab wounds. 
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury was shown a videotape of the murder scene that 
included the slashed and bloody corpses of the victims. Later that same day, Nicholas’ 
grandmother presented a VIS to the judge and jury: 
          “He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t 
          come home. And he cries for his sister, Lacie. He comes to me many 
          times during the week and asks me, Grandma, do you miss Lacie? And 
          I tell him yes. He says I’m worried about my Lacie.” App. 3 
          (​Payne v. Tennessee​, 1991) 
  
During his closing argument, the prosecutor implored the jury to seek the death 
sentence— as this could be the only true source of retribution and healing for Nicholas: 
          “But we do know that Nicholas was alive. And Nicholas was in the 
                       same room. Nicholas was still conscious. His eyes were open…He was  
                       able to hold his own intestines in as he was carried to the ambulance. So 
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                      he knew what happened to his mother and baby sister. There is nothing 
                      you [the jury] can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved in  
                      this case…but there is something that you can do for Nicholas. Somewhere  
                      down the road. Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He’s going to want  
                      to know what happened to his baby sister and mother. He is going to want 
                      to know what type of justice was done. With your verdict, you will provide 
                      the answer.”  
          (​Payne v. Tennessee​, 1991). 
  
The Court overruled two prior historic cases that strictly prohibited victim impact 
statements (​Booth v. Maryland,​ 1987; ​South Carolina v. Gathers​, 1989); stating that the Eighth 
Amendment does not distinctly prohibit the admission of victim impact evidence if it relates to 
the victim’s character, impact on surviving family members, and legitimately informs sentencers 
on the harm inflicted by the offender (Platania & Berman, 2006). As a result, Payne was 
sentenced to death. Justice O’Connor noted that most states have VIS legislation set in place and 
that its admissibility should be determined on a case-by-case basis (Logan, 1999; Nuñez, Myers, 
Wilkowski, & Schweitzer, 2017). 
As illustrated in ​Payne v. Tennessee​ (1991) and ​State v. Ard​ (1998), capital jurors are 
often burdened with immensely emotional testimonies and/or visual evidence just prior to 
rendering a decision on whether a defendant should live or die (Nuñez et al., 2017). Under the 
Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right to appear before an impartial jury of the 
State—impartial meaning a jury consisting of the defendant’s peers (laypersons). Human beings 
are naturally emotional creatures. Laypersons who are chosen to serve on a jury cannot be 
expected to control natural feelings of empathy. According to United States common law, 
sentencing decisions must be rendered on the justification of reason rather than caprice or 
emotion. The jury ought to focus on case facts and evidence as opposed to the emotions that are 
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evoked from victim impact testimonies when making a penalty decision. The very nature of 
victim impact statements however, is to allow pained family members/survivors to express their 
suffering and agony to jurors who are not in the practice of detaching their emotions from their 
judgments (Blumenthal, 2001). A paramount concern with the legal relevance of VIS is the 
capacity for such testimonies to elicit negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, disgust, rage, etc.) 
that will ultimately impede jurors’ objective reasoning abilities. Hence, decisions that are born 
from such emotional experiences lack “reasoned analysis” and are to be therefore considered 
prejudicial (Logan, 1999; Nuñez et al., 2017). 
In the landmark case, ​Booth v. Maryland ​(1977),  the Court affirmed that the conclusions 
drawn from emotionally-charged victim testimonies would render the jury incapable of making a 
decision based on reason rather than caprice or emotion, which is unquestionably vital in a 
capital case (Estrada-Reynolds, Schweitzer, & Nuñez, 1997; Nuñez et al., 2017). The overruling 
of this decision by ​Payne​ effectively raised the “per se” bar against such evidence and paved the 
way for highly prejudicial victim impact evidence to be utilized in subsequent capital cases 
(Burr, 2003; Logan 1999). Thus, leading to a fundamental question; do victim impact statements 
serve to aid the probative value of essential case evidence or do they serve to ensure a death 
sentence by appealing to jurors’ emotions?  
While few studies have explored the probative value of victim impact statements 
empirically, the available literature suggests that these emotionally-charged testimonies typically 
lead jurors to favor the death sentence in capital cases. Previous research has found that 
mock-jurors are markedly influenced by specific information pertaining to the victim’s suffering 
provided in VIS; thus, death penalty recommendations significantly increase when they are 
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presented with victim impact evidence (Green, Koehring, & Quiat, 1998). In their study, Green 
and colleagues (1998) additionally found that participant jurors were more likely to render the 
death sentence when the VIS alluded that the victim was a highly regarded member in the 
community. Furthermore, researchers Platania and Moran (1999) found that participant-jurors 
who were exposed to statements made by the prosecutor outlining the effects of the defendant’s 
actions on the surviving victims/family members (much like the prosecutor in ​Payne​) were 
significantly more likely to render the death penalty versus participants who were not exposed 
(Platania & Berman, 2006). In summary, victim impact statements that are presented to jurors 
just prior to rendering a sentence of life or death not only raise the question of legal relevance, 
but may in fact ensure a sentence of death.  
Photographic and Videotaped Victim Impact Evidence 
As in cases such as ​State v. Ard ​(1998) and ​Payne v.​ ​Tennessee​ (1991), juries are often 
confronted with incredibly disturbing and gruesome photographic evidence to accompany victim 
impact statements; such as photographs of victims at the scene of the crime, autopsy photos, and 
even dismembered body parts. (Douglas et al., 1997). For example, in 1989, 28-year-old William 
Dutton Maddox Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder for repeatedly stabbing a motel owner 
to death in Cobb County, Georgia. Maddox appeared before a jury where prosecutors presented a 
graphic videotape taken at the scene of the crime by law enforcement. The colored video 
displayed the victim lying lifelessly in a corner in a pool of his own blood with his arms, face, 
chest, and back slashed (Kassin & Garfield, 1991). Similar to VIS, photographic victim impact 
evidence has been utilized in a wide variety of criminal cases (including capital trials), however 
there is very little that delineates what is generally admissible. To the prosecution, such evidence 
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may serve as a crucial element to the collection of case evidence leading towards the defendant’s 
guilt and prison sentence. Alternatively, defense attorneys may view the same photograph as 
prejudicial and inflammatory, sacrificing the defendant’s right to a fair trial (Douglas et al., 
1997). Returning to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges must not determine 
“​whether​ gruesome photographs affect verdicts [and sentencing decision], but ​how​ and ​why​” 
(Salerno, 2017, p. 346).  
Can juries separate their emotions and feelings of disgust from their legal decisions? In a 
criminal case, ​Kuntzelman v. Black ​(1985), the prosecution aided the testimony of a pathologist 
who performed the victim’s autopsy with particularly gruesome colored photographs of the 
victim’s body at various stages of the autopsy; one photograph of the open chest cavity and 
internal organs of the victim’s body and another of the victim’s left lung placed on a table. The 
jury, who was privy to all of these photographs, found the defendant guilty. Kuntzelman filed a 
federal habeas corpus arguing that “the photographs were so inflammatory as to influence the 
jury to find intent where they might not have otherwise done so. Therefore contending that the 
admission of these photographs into evidence denied him due process and a fair trial under the 
fourteenth amendment” (​Kuntzelman v. Black​, 1985). In a similar case, a juror was interviewed 
after finding a defendant guilty after viewing gruesome photographic evidence. The juror stated, 
“I just kept seeing that woman’s body. It was obscene what he did to her” (Kassin & Garfield, 
1991, p. 1460). For the purpose of this study, gruesome photographs will be defined as, 
depictions of victims’ injuries that are extremely unpleasant and shocking (Salerno, 2017). Legal 
scholars and defense lawyers alike are increasingly arguing that the “blood and guts” depicted in 
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these gruesome photographs (such as in ​Kuntzelman​) are only admitted to increase the 
prosecution’s chance at winning (Kassin & Garfield, 1991).  
Consistent with victim impact statements, empirical research on the prejudicial nature of 
photographic victim impact evidence is relatively sparse. One particular study to note, Douglas 
and colleagues (1997), hypothesized that viewing color autopsy photographs will result in 
participants rendering a higher guilty rate than viewing no autopsy photographs at all. 
Additionally, they hypothesized that there would be no differences between participants’ 
reported ability to be fair and impartial jurors, regardless of whether or not they were privy to the 
autopsy photographs. Their results indicated that participants who were exposed to autopsy 
photos (both color and black/white) were twice as likely to render a guilty verdict than 
participants who were not exposed to photographic evidence. Moreover, for each condition, 
mock-jurors maintained that the photographic evidence should not and did not impact their 
verdicts (approximately 7.5 out of 10) and that they acted in “a fair and impartial manner in the 
current mock trials and also could do so in an actual trial” (Douglas et al., 1997, p. 499). 
Although no attempt was made to diminish juror bias via judicial instructions on photographic 
evidence, the implications of this study are alarming. If jurors are unable to recognize the extent 
to which victim impact evidence (i.e., photographic, videotaped, VIS) affects their 
decision-making, then it would be impractical to expect them to restrain or control the impact of 
this gruesome/emotionally-laden evidence when instructed to do so by a judge (Douglas et al., 
1997).  
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Emotional Evidence in Court  
Emotional reactions to gruesome evidentiary details such as VIS and photographs have 
been found to impede logical and rational decision-making processes—effectively hindering 
jurors from delivering a verdict or recommending a sentence based solely on the probative value 
of victim impact evidence rather than its prejudicial value (Bright & Goodman-Delehunty, 
2011). Furthermore, the involvement of gruesome victim impact evidence in a trial has the 
potential to not only induce sympathy for the victim(s), but to generate outrage at the crime, 
leading to a propensity to convict the offender. Previous research has established that following 
exposure to grisly photographs, emotional arousal significantly increases (Bright & 
Goodman-Delehunty, 2006; Douglas et al., 1997). More specifically, Bright and 
Goodman-Delehunty (2011) note that “increased emotional arousal is associated with guilty 
verdicts, and that ​anger​ [specifically] mediates the influence of gruesome photographs on mock 
juror decision-making.”  
To further examine this conjecture, Bright and Goodman-Delehunty (2011) conducted a 2 
(photographic evidence) x 2 (injury severity) x 2 (information processing route instruction) 
mock-juror study. They hypothesized that participants who were exposed to gruesome evidence 
would reveal increased levels of anger toward the defendant and sympathy toward the victim in 
comparison to participants from whom the gruesome evidence was withheld. Participants were 
assigned to one of four groups; each group received one of four versions of a trial transcript 
(accompanied by photographic evidence illustrating varying degrees of injury) for a pedestrian 
filing a negligence suit against the defendant for hitting her with his car. The four trial transcript 
conditions were: (1) gruesome photographs, moderate injury severity; (2) gruesome photographs, 
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 14 
 
high injury severity; (3) neutral photographs, moderate injury severity; and (4) neutral 
photographs, high injury severity. The moderate injury severity condition included information 
in which the plaintiff reported that she suffered, “serious injuries to legs”; “severe pain”; 
“frequent headaches”; and was “confined to a wheelchair the majority of the time, but [was] able 
to walk using [a] walking frame for short distances.” The high injury severity condition listed 
injuries such as, “paralyzed from the waist down”; “confined to a wheelchair”; “suffered a 
complete transaction of the spinal cord”; “requires assistance with showering, dressing, and 
grooming”; “experiences constant bad headaches and migraines”; and “has extensive ongoing 
needs in relation to suitable modified housing, wheelchair, hoists, shower trolley, and 
medications.” To improve ecological validity, Bright and Goodman-Delehunty (2011) provided 
judicial instructions (similar to those given in civil jury cases in Australian courts) to all 
participants before requesting their sentencing decisions. Results indicated that mock-jurors who 
were exposed to victim impact evidence depicting victims’ severe injuries experienced stronger 
affective reactions such as anger and punitive desires, however the difference was relatively 
small and this finding did not reach statistical significance. In addition, when instructed to render 
a liability verdict, participants were twice as likely to hold the defendant liable when moderate 
injury details were accompanied by gruesome photographs as opposed to neutral photographs 
(Bright & Goodman-Delehunty, 2011). A possible limitation of this study is that all participants 
received judicial instructions on how to properly weigh emotional evidence in a civil case, 
thereby relinquishing the potential for mock-jurors (in a control group, for example) to express 
their instinctive anger toward the defendant. Moreover, participants were merely asked whether 
the defendant should be held liable for the damages inflicted on the plaintiff—implying 
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monetary punishment. Participants were not required to sentence the defendant to prison time or 
even to death, which may increase the emotionality of their final decision(s).  
 Affect-driven information processing is consistent with a number of dual-processing 
theories of cognition and social judgment. The Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; 
Epstein, 1994) contends that humans process information via two parallel and interactive 
information processing systems: (1) an experiential system (2) a rational system. The 
experiential system processes information automatically and rapidly—a “gut-level” information 
processing system that is more reactive to imagery. Whereas the rational system is inferential 
and functions according to rules of logic, evidence, and reasoning—and is therefore highly 
demanding of cognitive resources (Epstein, 1994; Bright & Goodman-Delehunty, 2011). Epstein, 
Lipson, Holstein & Huh (1992) therefore assert that jurors who process information 
predominantly in the experiential mode may be more susceptible to making decisions based on 
affect rather than reason. While it is impossible to investigate jurors’ information processing 
systems during the voir dire phase of a criminal trial, it is important to understand that some 
jurors may in fact utilize this type of information processing unknowingly and may consequently 
be more impressionable by prejudicial evidence.  
 Similarly, Haidt’s social-intuitionist approach supports the claim that moral judgment 
may function on a dual-processing system (​Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994)​. Analogously 
labeled, “emotional” and “rational”, Haidt argues that although humans are capable of conscious 
step-by-step moral reasoning, more often than not, people tend to make automatic moral 
judgments according to immediate/intuitive perception. The repercussions of such impetuous 
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moral judgments (especially judgments born from anger) in a capital case setting would 
be—quite literally—lethal.  
A tertiary theory in legal decision making is the appraisal theory, which can be reduced to 
the assertion that ‘an angry juror is a certain juror’ (​Tiedens & Linton, 2001)​. Indeed, anger is 
often associated with feelings of certainty in comparison to other emotions such as sadness or 
depression (​Tiedens & Linton, 2001)​. Part of the prejudicial nature of victim impact evidence is 
its potential to induce feelings of anger. By this logic, when an angry juror feels certain about 
his/her intuitive moral judgments, they are less inclined to listen to additional aggravating or 
mitigating evidence and maintain that the information already received is correct and complete 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Moreover, the juror may be processing additional information 
heuristically and be more attentive to superficial cues as opposed to logical cues (Estrada et al., 
1997). Tiedens and Linton (2001) argue that because the feeling of certainty is an internal cue 
that one is already correct and accurate in their assumptions/conclusions, it may also indicate that 
further information processing is unnecessary.  
 Additionally, anger is associated with lower quality information processing than fear and 
sadness. Anger tends to lead people to make indiscriminately punitive judgments, which also 
undermines information processing—producing what legal scholars call, “the prosecutorial 
mindset” (Lerner, & Tiedens, 2006; Nuñez et al., 2017, p. 865). The prosecutorial mindset 
occurs because anger carries infusive potential to linger past the triggering events, and thus 
influence the most basic social judgment and decision-making processes. Lerner, Goldberg and 
Tetlock (1998) contend that angering jurors (even in an experimental setting) results in a 
motivation to blame and avenge the defendant for his/her wrongdoing and ensure that they are 
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appropriately punished, compromising a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Indeed, numerous 
studies have found that angry mock-jurors are significantly more likely to attribute causal 
responsibility to blame and punish the offender than sad jurors—even to the extent of sentencing 
the offender to death (e.g., Estrada et al., 1997; Nuñez et al., 2017).  
Memory Distortion and Emotion Memory 
During the voir dire phase of a capital trial, potential jurors are subjected to “death 
qualification” questions that determine whether they would be able to objectively consider both 
mitigating and aggravating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. Should they be 
selected, the jurors who render the “guilty” vs. “not guilty” verdict will in fact be the same jurors 
who sentence the defendant to either life in prison or to death. Regardless of the length in time 
between phases, capital jurors are expected to accurately remember details of the case that have 
been presented to them throughout the entirety of the trial. Considering the physiological effects 
that emotionally charged images and testimonies can have on attention and decision-making, it is  
imperative to question whether memory distortion can arise as a result of this. Furthermore if 
such as effect does exist, we must also inquire as to whether memory distortion can hinder jurors 
from accurately weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence prior to sentencing a defendant to 
either life imprisonment or to death.  
The malleability of memory and its susceptibility to distortion has been thoroughly 
examined for several decades (Loftus, 2005). Though the evidence supporting memory distortion 
is robust, individuals often believe that emotionally charged memories (i.e., traumatic memories) 
are impervious to distortion given how vividly they remain in our minds. However, previous 
research has found that all memories--even traumatic memories--are vulnerable to distortion 
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(Strange & Takarangi, 2012). Distortion here, meaning changes in participants’ responses and 
recollection of events over time. For example, Loftus and Burns (1982) exposed participants to a 
film portraying a bank robbery. Half of the participants were shown a film where a bank robber 
shot a little boy in the face while running out of the bank. The other half of the participants were 
shown the same film until the shooting, which was replaced with security camera footage of the 
bank manager telling everyone to remain calm. Immediately after viewing the film, memory tests 
were administered to the participants. Consistent with their hypotheses Loftus and Burns (1982) 
found that participants who were exposed to the mentally upsetting/stressful version of the film 
(witnessing the murder of the little boy) demonstrated significantly poorer recall for specific 
details of the film.  
The mechanism explaining memory distortion in highly stressful—and even 
traumatic—situations (i.e., serving as a juror on a capital case) is likely to be a failure in source 
monitoring (SM) during the encoding and retrieval of event(s) (Strange & Takarangi, 2015). In 
brief, the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) asserts that the foundation of SM is built upon 
the combination of memory characteristics and judgement processes. The primary characteristics 
of memory that contribute to this framework are perceptual information (i.e., sound and color), 
contextual information (i.e., spatial and temporal), semantic detail and affective information (i.e, 
emotional reactions), and cognitive operations (i.e., records of organization, elaborating, 
retrieving, and identifying)--all of which are created during the formation of the memory itself. 
The judgement processes that follow are twofold; the first being a more “automatic” process that 
relies on heuristics, while the second is more “controlled” and relies on retrieving information 
systematically (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Further research has established that 
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post-event processing (i.e., discussing the event with others, or learning additional/contrasting 
information) can affect the familiarity of certain details that were not encoded originally, making 
them feel real which can lead to source monitoring errors (Segovia, Strange, & Takarangi, 2016).  
Strange and Takarangi (2012) investigate the role of memory distortion in the 
perpetuation of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms. Specifically, they sought to 
answer whether individuals in a laboratory setting can perceive an event as being more traumatic 
than experienced. They instructed participants to watch a short film depicting a fatal car 
accident; including the scenes prior to the accident, the accident itself, and the aftermath of the 
accident with the driver who caused the accident being taken to the hospital. Some of the clips 
that contained critical information about the event were removed from the film. Twenty-four 
hours after viewing the film, participants were given a surprise memory test where they were 
shown 18 clips and asked if the clips were in fact part of the original film they saw the day 
before. Overall, Strange and Takarangi (2012) found that participants were most likely to falsely 
remember clips that were more traumatic than clips that were less traumatic/emotionally-laden. 
They suggested that the 24-hour delay allowed participants to ruminate (either intentionally or 
unintentionally) on the negative material, thus allowing the details to invade their memory and 
result in source monitoring errors at test (Strange & Takarangi, 2012; Schacter, 2001). Similarly, 
in the present study, we seek to investigate whether participants who are exposed to disturbingly 
graphic images while hearing an emotionally laden victim impact testimony will experience 
source monitoring errors that will ultimately lead to memory distortion. 
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Judicial Instruction 
United States jurisprudence regarding judicial instruction in capital cases has become a 
focal point of legal fairness and constitutional rights advocates (Haney & Lynch, 1994). 
Landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as ​Simmons v. South Carolina​ (1994), ​Furman v. 
Georgia ​(1972)  and ​Gregg v. Georgia​ (1976) give prominence to the necessity for a 
procedurally just system that ensures capital juries are adequately equipped to make such 
decisions regarding a defendant’s life. “On the one hand,” Haney and Lynch (1994) contend, 
“appellate courts have insisted that a capital jury’s discretion must be guided (so that statutory 
schemes failing to provide standards or guidelines for use in penalty decision making have been 
prohibited. On the other hand, these same courts have required capital juries to exercise 
individualized discretion (so that statutory schemes making one or another outcome in a capital 
case automatic or mandatory also have been found unconstitutional)” (p. 412). Penalty 
deliberations (in most states) commence with trial judges providing jurors with a sequence of 
instructions and factors to consider when making their sentencing decisions (i.e., weighing 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, emotional evidence, etc.)-- all of which should serve to aid 
the jury in making such a difficult decision as to whether a life should be taken or spared (Haney 
& Lynch, 1994; Luginbuhl & Howe, 1994). In comparison with noncaptial and civil jurors, 
capital jurors are “much more at the mercy of their instructions” (Luginbuhl & Howe, 1994, p. 
1161) and are reliant on the judge to tell them how to comprehend such material.  
Although judicial instructions vary across states, jurisdictions that actively enforce them 
require that three main concepts regarding aggravating and mitigating factors are clearly 
described: (1) the domain from which the aggravating and mitigating factors may be selected, (2) 
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the burden of proof required to prove the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors; and (3) 
whether or not unanimity is required to establish the existence of aggravating and mitigating 
factors (Luginbuhl & Howe, 1994). Luginbuhl and Howe (1994) partnered with the Capital Jury 
Project to investigate the personal experiences of capital jurors and delve into how judicial 
instructions may aid or complicate their decisions. They found that jurors are often unaware that 
all evidence introduced to the trial can be considered mitigating evidence so long as the judge 
determines that the evidence is relevant/admissible (has substantial probative value). The 
consequences of this misconception can be grave. To exacerbate the issue, capital jurors often 
believe that they are permitted to consider ​any​ evidence as aggravating evidence-- effectively 
expanding the range of factors that can be used to warrant a death sentence over life 
imprisonment. In the context on victim impact statements, previous research has indicated that 
VIS are often the source of aggravating evidence that is required for jurors to justify the death 
sentence (Luginbuhl & Burkhead, 1995). Therefore, our question in the present study is whether 
participant-jurors will weigh the importance of aggravating and mitigating evidence similarly 
regardless if they are given general judicial instructions or VIE specific instructions.  
Study Overview 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the combined effects of textual victim 
impact statements (VIS), photographic evidence, and judicial instructions on juror memory 
distortion and sentencing decisions in a capital case. To date, previous literature has yet to 
thoroughly examine the combined effects of VIS and photographic evidence on sentencing 
decisions, although both are routinely paired together when presented in court. Furthermore, the 
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effects of memory distortion and judicial instruction are not well understood in relation to juror 
sentencing decisions. 
Briefly, participant-jurors were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and 
instructed to read a murder case file in addition to a victim impact statement during the 
sentencing phase of a capital case. The three conditions of the experiment consisted of a (1) 
‘Control’ group, where participants received only the textual VIS in addition to the trial 
transcript; a (2) ‘Family Photo’ group, where participants were provided with a photograph of 
the victim at the beach with his family (before the crime); and (3) a ‘Crime Scene Photo’ group, 
where participants were provided with a gruesome photograph intended for high emotional 
intensity of the murdered victim at the scene of the crime. Within each condition half of the 
participants received specific judicial instruction on how to properly weigh the aggravating 
victim impact evidence, while the other half received more general instruction. Twenty-four 
hours later, all participants completed a memory recall test and were instructed to sentence the 
defendant to either life in prison or to death. Additionally, participants’ emotional states were 
evaluated via the Juror Negative Affect Scale (JUNAS) to investigate the relationship between 
anger level and sentence severity. Participants’ affect were recorded prior to viewing trial 
materials to establish baseline emotions, immediately after viewing all of the victim impact 
evidence, and just prior to rendering a decision after the memory recall test.  
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Method 
Participants 
 A total of 749 participants were recruited for this study via Amazon’s mTurk. We 
restricted the study to workers within the United States who had a high rate of approval from 
other researchers.  However, 229 participants were excluded from the study due to failed 
attention checks and failing to return to Day 2 of the study. An additional 117 participants were 
excluded from the study because they were not “death qualified” (​Wainwright v. Witt, ​1985). 
Therefore, 403 death qualified, jury-eligible participants from the United States (152 males, 228 
females, 2 transgender, and 2 other) between the ages of 18 and 72 years old (​M​age​ = 37.73, ​SD ​ = 
11.57) completed this study. Of our sample, 79.4% of the participants were white, 9.18% were 
black, 4.46% were Hispanic, 4.7% were Asian and 1.4% were of other descents. In comparison 
to previous studies with smaller sample sizes and university student participants, the sample in 
the present study is a reliable representation of the U.S. population. Approximately 74% of 
participants had never served on a jury before, 21% had previously served on a jury. All 
participants were compensated a total of $5.00 ($4.00 for day 1, and $1.00 for day 2).  
Design 
Our design conformed to a 3 (victim impact evidence: textual VIS only, VIS with family 
image, VIS with crime scene image) x 2 (judicial instruction: VIS specific, general) between 
groups experimental design.  
Materials 
Death qualification questionnaire. ​Potential participants answered a three-item death 
qualification questionnaire to determine if they were eligible to participate in the study. The 
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questions were consistent with the pre-trial death qualification criteria administered in 
Wainwright v. Witt​ (1985). There were three close-ended “yes/no” questions. Items included, 
“Would your attitudes toward the death penalty seriously affect your ability to perform your 
juror duties?”; “Would you find a defendant ‘not guilty’ in order to avoid the possibility of 
giving the death sentence?”; and “Would you either always or never give the death penalty?” 
Individuals who reported no objections to the death penalty when sentencing the defendant were 
permitted to further participate in the study.  
Juror negative affect scale (JUNAS). ​Participants were instructed to complete the Juror 
Negative Affect Scale (JUNAS; Bright & Goodman-Delehunty, 2006) three times during the 
study; once prior to viewing the victim impact evidence, once immediately after viewing the VIE 
and immediately preceding their capital sentence decision submissions, and once prior to 
answering memory questions on Day 2. The JUNAS combines the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppelman, 1981) and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) including 30 items and four subscales: fear/anxiety, 
sadness, anger, and disgust. Participant-jurors were instructed to complete the JUNAS by 
circling the response that best describes how he/she is feeling at the moment on a 5-point scale 
Likert scale (1 = ​very slightly or not at all​, 5 = ​extremely​). Items included emotions such as, 
“angry, furious, resentful, sad, disgusted, and revolted.” Watson et al. (1988) indicate the internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s 𝛼) to be acceptably high for measuring negative affect, ranging between 
0.84 and 0.87 (𝛼 = 0.87).  
Trial transcript. ​All participants were presented with a trial transcript outlining the 
judicial proceedings of the case during the guilt phase. The transcript was derived from a video 
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from a mock-jury study conducted by Diamond, Casper, Heiert, and Marshall (1996). Originally 
an hour and 25 minutes in length, the content of the video transcript was reduced to 
approximately 17 pages including the judge’s, prosecution, and defense opening/closing 
statements, expert testimonies, aggravating/mitigating evidence, and the guilty verdict. Elements 
of the transcript such as the defendant’s and victim’s names were adapted to fit the details of our 
study (see Appendix for full trial summary). 
Victim impact evidence judicial instructions. ​From reading the trial transcript evidence 
summary, all participants were made aware that during the guilt phase of the trial, the defendant 
was found guilty on all four counts of murder, attempted kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery. 
Prior to viewing any victim impact evidence, half of the participants within each of the three 
conditions were randomly selected and given specific VIS judicial instructions by the judge. The 
judge informed the selected participant-jurors that they would be presented with a testimony 
given by the victim’s wife and that they were to give appropriate consideration to this 
aggravating evidence before sentencing the defendant. The judicial instructions were provided in 
textual format for participant-jurors to read before viewing the victim impact evidence and 
retrieved from a study conducted by Platania and Berman (2006)-- taken verbatim from ​Brooks 
v. State​ (1979). The remaining participants were provided with general judicial instructions (see 
Appendix for full judicial instructions). 
Victim impact statement (VIS). ​All participants were provided with a textual victim 
impact statement created and obtained from a field study of capital trials (Nuñez et al., 2017; 
Nuñez, Egan-Wright, Kehn, & Myers, 2011). For their study, Nuñez et al., (2011) piloted and 
analyzed the emotional content within the VIS by a measure of linguistic content (1 = ​not at all 
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angry,​ 9 = ​extremely angry​) and (1 = ​not at all sad,​ 9 = ​extremely sad​). The VIS chosen for the 
current study was rated by participants as being high in both anger (M​anger​ = 7.73) and sadness 
(M​sadness​ = 6.82). Consequently, in both linguistic content and individual ratings, the VIS was 
“highly emotional” (Nuñez et al., 2017, p. 871). 
Photographs. ​Participants in the ‘Family Photo’ condition were exposed to a colored 
photograph alongside the same textual victim impact statement that was provided to all 
conditions. The photograph for this condition was intended to portray the victim with his family 
(wife and two young sons) having a pleasant day at the beach. In a pilot study, participants 
recruited via mTurk rated three separate family photographs on the level of sadness the 
photographs evoked (upon learning the father had been killed) on a Likert scale (1 = ​not at all 
sad​, 7 = ​extremely sad​). The photograph chosen for this study (a family at the beach) evoked 
significantly higher levels of sadness (​M​ = 5.87) in comparison to photographs depicting a 
family on a camping trip (​M​ = 5.59) and a family at the park (​M​ = 5.275). 
Participants in the ‘Crime Scene Photo’ condition were exposed to a gruesome 
photograph (in color) alongside the same textual victim impact statement that was provided to all 
conditions. The photograph for this condition was intended to portray the victim immediately 
after he had been murdered; the blood covering the victim’s face are clearly visible. The 
photograph was obtained from the International Affective Picture System where it received 
uniformly high “traumatic” and “disgusting” ratings (6.98 out of 7.00).  
Attention checks.​ To ensure that all participants were paying adequate attention, 
participants were instructed to answer 3 multiple-choice questions pertaining to general facts 
about the case. Items included, “How was the victim (Jeff Mason) murdered?”; “Which of Jeff 
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Mason’s (victim) family members provided a testimony describing the effect of losing Jeff?”; 
and “If you were shown a photo in the court transcript, who was portrayed in the photo you were 
shown?” Failure to correctly answer all three attention questions resulted in termination of 
further participation in the study.  
Memory recall task. ​All participants were instructed to complete two parts of a memory 
recall task. The first part of the task was given immediately after participants read the trial 
transcript--just prior to sentencing the defendant to either life in prison or to death. The second 
part of the task was given to participants 24 hours after viewing the victim impact evidence. The 
purpose of this measure was to indicate the participants’ levels of memory recall and memory 
distortion (change over time) immediately after viewing emotionally charged evidence, and after 
a short delay. The multiple choice questions tested participants’ memory of attributes of the 
murder, defendant, victim/victim’s family, and evidence--details which were all included in the 
trial summary provided. For example, “How much money did Anthony Prentice [the defendant] 
steal from Jeff Mason [the victim]?”; “What was the defendant’s IQ?”; and “How many children 
did Jeff Mason have?”  
Level of Agreement 
In addition to testing participant’s recall of specific case details, participants were also 
asked to rate their level of agreement with the guilt verdict, how easy or difficult they found the 
experience of deciding between life imprisonment and the death sentence, how confident they 
were that they made the right decision, and how satisfied they were with their final decision. 
These questions were presented on a Likert scale (1 = ​very slightly or not at all​, 5 = ​extremely​).  
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 28 
 
Procedure 
Potential participants who expressed interest in participating in this study were instructed 
to complete an initial death qualification questionnaire via the Qualtrics website. People who 
reported no objections to the death penalty and indicated that they would be able to reasonably 
consider both mitigating and aggravating evidence per the judge’s instructions when sentencing 
the defendant were permitted to further participate in the study. Participants were asked to 
complete a consent form in addition to a demographics form. The informed consent specified 
that researchers were interested in how mock jurors make sentencing decisions in capital trials. 
For ethical reasons, participants also were warned that they may be subject to gruesome material 
in textual and visual form. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
Control Group, Family Photo Group, or Crime Scene Photo. Participants in each group were 
prompted to complete the JUNAS for the purpose of gathering information regarding their initial 
emotional states.  
Participants were instructed to pay close attention to the following materials presented 
because as of that moment, they would be serving as participant-jurors in a capital murder case. 
Participants were also told that the defendant in the case had already been found guilty and that 
the trial was proceeding to the penalty phase, where they (the participant) would be required to 
sentence the defendant to either life in prison or to death. Participants in the Control group were 
prompted to read the trial transcript and the subsequent victim impact statement. Participants in 
Family Photo were prompted to read the trial transcript evidence summary (identical to the 
control group) and the subsequent VIS; however, participants in this group were also exposed to 
the “Family” image while reading the VIS. Participants in the Crime Scene Photo group were 
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prompted to read the trial transcript evidence summary (identical to the control group and 
experimental group 1) and the subsequent VIS; however, participants in this group were also 
exposed to the gruesome “Crime Scene” image while reading the VIS. It is important to note 
however, that prior to viewing any victim impact evidence, half of the participants within each of 
the three conditions were randomly selected and given VIS specific judicial instructions by the 
judge. The judge informed the selected participant-jurors that they would be presented with a 
testimony given by the victim’s mother and that they were to give appropriate consideration to 
this aggravating evidence before sentencing the defendant.  
After viewing all of the materials, the participants were prompted to complete the JUNAS 
once again. Immediately following their responses, participants were instructed to sentence the 
defendant to either life imprisonment or death. Participants rated their levels of confidence and 
ease in regards to their sentencing decision. After completing attention checks, participants 
completed the first round of memory questions before being instructed to log back into the 
Qualtrics website in exactly 24 hours to conclude the final portion of the study.  
The following day, participants were prompted to fill out the JUNAS scale for the final 
time and complete the second memory recall task. In addition, participants again rated their 
levels of confidence in their sentencing decision and were ask to weigh the effects of aggravating 
and mitigating evidence on their final decisions.  
A demographics form asked participants to provide information regarding their age, sex, 
education level, primary language, and history of jury duty. Participants were thanked, debriefed 
and awarded a $5.00 Amazon gift certificate for their participation.  
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Hypotheses and Data Analysis 
Hypothesis 1: We predicted that participant-jurors who were privy to photographic 
evidence would be more inclined to impose a harsher sentence on the defendant when given the 
choice between the death penalty and life imprisonment without parole (LIWP). Specifically, we 
hypothesized that participants in the ‘Family Photo’ group would be more likely to sentence the 
defendant to death than participants in the ‘Control’ group. Additionally, participants in the 
‘Crime Scene Photo’ group would be more likely to sentence the defendant to death than 
participants in both the ‘Family Photo’ and ‘Control’ groups. To test this hypothesis, a binomial 
logistic regression was performed.  
Hypothesis 2a: We predicted that there would be no significant difference in verdict 
decisions between participant-jurors who received general judicial instructions and VIE specific 
judicial instructions. To test this hypothesis, ‘type of judicial instruction’ was included as an 
independent, interaction variable in the above binomial logistic regression. 
Hypothesis 2b: We predicted that there would be no significant difference in the 
perceived importance of aggravating and mitigating evidence between participant-jurors who 
received general judicial instructions and VIE specific judicial instructions. To test this 
hypothesis, two independent-samples t-tests were performed--with one test pertaining to the 
importance aggravating evidence and the other pertaining to the importance of mitigating 
evidence.  
Hypothesis 3: We predicted that participants who were in the ‘Crime Scene Photo’ and 
‘Family Photo’ groups would display higher levels of memory distortion regarding case details 
presented in the trial transcript than participants in the ‘Control’ group. To test this hypothesis, 
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five separate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) analyses were performed--each test pertaining to a 
different type of memory distortion question.  
Hypothesis 4: Lastly, we predicted that participants who reported higher levels of anger 
immediately following exposure to the victim impact evidence would report higher levels of 
confidence in their verdict decisions as well. To test this hypothesis, a linear regression was 
performed to assess the relationship between anger and confidence.  
Results 
Verdict Decisions 
Overall, participant-jurors sentenced the defendant to death (59.1%) slightly more than 
life imprisonment (40.9%). However contrary to our hypotheses, the logistic regression model 
was not statistically significant, χ​2​(5) = 1.522, ​p​ = .91. The model explained 0.005% (Nagelkerke 
R​2​) of the variance in verdict decision and correctly classified 59.0% of cases. Of the two 
predictor variables, neither was statistically significant (refer to Table 1). The area under the 
ROC curve was .535, 95% CI [.478 to .593]. 
Table 1 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Verdict Decision Based on Photographs and Judicial Instructions 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                         B         SE        Wald        ​df          ​p         ​ Odds                95% 
CI for       Ratio                Odds 
Ratio 
          Lower            Upper 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Control Group             2        .841  
Control v. Family Photo                              -.077     .356         .047       1        .829         .926            .460              1.862 
Control v. Crime Scene Photo                     -.210     .361         .339       1        .560         .810            .399 
1.645 
General v. Specific Judicial Instructions     .095      .357         .071       1        .790         1.100          .546              2.216 
Judicial Instructions * Control                                         .416       2        .812 
General Instructions by Family Photo         -.291    .497         .342       1        .559          .748           .283              1.980  
General Instructions by Crime Scene          -.033    .503         .004       1        .947          .967           .361              2.592 
Constant             .470     .255         3.399     1        .065          1.600         .097              2.64  
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Importance of Aggravating and Mitigating Evidence (Judicial Instructions) 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the importance of aggravating evidence was weighed 
similarly by jurors who received general instructions (​M​ = 4.27, ​SD​ = 0.889) and jurors who 
received VIE specific instructions (​M​ = 4.22, ​SD​ = 1.017), 95% CI [-.129, .245], ​t​(399.56) = 
.609, ​p​ = .543(refer to table 2). The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated as 
assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (​p​ = .031). There were no outliers in the data.  
Additionally, consistent with our hypothesis, the importance of mitigating evidence was 
weighed similarly by jurors who received general instructions (​M​ = 2.510, ​SD​ = 1.210) and 
jurors who received VIE specific instructions (​M​ = 2.56, ​SD​ = 1.216), 95% CI [-.292, .183], 
t​(401) = -.449, ​p​ = .765 (refer to table 2). The Levene's test for equality of variances displayed 
that the assumption of homogeneity of variances for mitigating evidence was met. There were no 
outliers in the data.  
Table 2 
Independent Samples t-test Displays the Importance of Aggravating and Mitigating Evidence on Verdict 
Decisions 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      Levene’s Test for Equality  
                of Variances                                           t-test for Equality of Means 
     ______________________________________________________________  
 
        F           Sig.          t             ​df​          Sig.(2-tailed)        Mean         Std. Error 
                    Difference    Difference 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Agg. Strength      General Instructions   4.67       .031       .606        401              .545                .058               .095 
                            Specific Instructions                               .609        399.56         .543                .058               .095 
 
Mitg. Strength     General Instructions   .089       .765       -.449       401              .654                -.054              .121 
Specific Instructions                              -.449       399.05         .654               -.054               .121 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Memory Distortion 
Five separate one-way ANOVAs were run to determine whether memory distortion 
would increase with exposure to varying levels of photographic victim impact evidence.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, participants recalled case details uniformly correctly across 
conditions. If memory distortion had been present, participants would have incorrectly recalled 
details significantly more often during Part 2 of the memory recall task than Part 1. Cronbach’s 
alpha demonstrated that the internal consistency of the memory questions pertaining to the 
recollection of aggravating evidence (​𝛼 = .462), mitigating evidence (𝛼 = .247), VIS attributes (𝛼 
= .386), and murder attributes (𝛼 = -.064) were indeed quite poor. ​Thus, descriptive statistics 
pertaining to mean recall accuracy were reported in lieu of typical inferential statistics: 
aggravating evidence (​M​ = 78.3%); mitigating evidence (​M​ = 76.6%); VIS attributes (​M​ = 
75.1%); murder attributes (​M​ = 76.3%) (refer to table 3). 
Table 3 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ​% Correct 
______________________________________________________________ 
                   Type of Question                 Question 1         Question 2         Question 3          Question 4        Average 
% 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Memory for Aggravating Evidence       361 (92.3%)       287 (73.4%)       271 (69.3%)                                    78.3% 
Memory for Mitigating Evidence          371 (94.9%)       242 (61.9%)       355 (90.8%)        232 (59.3%)        76.7% 
Memory for VIS       341 (88.3%)      259 (67.1%)        270 (69.9%)                                    75.1% 
Memory of Murder Attributes               361 (91.6%)       353 (89.6%)       105 (26.6%)        384 (97.5%)        76.3% 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Anger as a Predictor of Confidence in Verdict Decision 
 
Lastly, we ran a linear regression to establish whether increased levels in anger (reported 
via the JUNAS) could statistically predict confidence in verdict decisions. Our results were not 
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statistically significant ​F​(1, 401) = 2.901, ​p​ = .089 (refer to table 4). Anger levels accounted for 
7% of the explained variability in confidence of verdict decisions with adjusted ​R​2​= 0.05%, a 
small size effect according to Cohen (1988). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Linear Regression Predicting Level of Verdict Confidence Based on Reported Anger Levels 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                         B            SE           Beta             t          ​p         ​      95% CI for 
                           Odds Ratio 
       Lower            Upper 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant            7.453       .100                         74.415        .000         7.256             7.650 
T2_JUNAS_Anger             .019        .011           .085        1.703         .089         -.003                .041 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Discussion 
The overall purpose of this study was to examine the combined effects of victim impact 
statements and photographic evidence on juror memory distortion and sentencing decisions. 
Although our results did not reach statistical significance regarding sentencing decisions, the 
implications from our analyses of judicial instructions may prove useful in further studies and 
psycholegal literature. 
We hypothesized that participant-jurors who were exposed to increasing levels of 
emotionally-laden photographic evidence would be more inclined to sentence the defendant to 
death as opposed to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LIWP). Specifically, we 
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predicted that participants who were exposed to a photograph depicting the victim at the scene of 
the crime would be significantly more likely to sentence the defendant to death than participants 
who viewed a photograph of the victim with his family prior to the crime or no photo at all. In 
contrast with our hypothesis and previous research (e.g., Green, Koehring, & Quiat, 1998; 
Platania & Berman, 2006) we found no significant differences in sentencing decisions. Across 
conditions, participants uniformly sentenced the defendant to death slightly more than half of the 
time.  
Our second hypothesis was that there would be no significant difference in verdict 
decisions between participant-jurors who received general judicial instructions and VIE specific 
judicial instructions. In addition, we also hypothesized that there would be no significant 
difference in the perceived importance of aggravating and mitigating evidence between 
participant-jurors who received general judicial instructions and VIE specific judicial 
instructions. Indeed, our results supported this hypothesis and are consistent with previous 
research regarding this concept (e.g., Luginbuhl & Howe, 1994; Platania & Berman 2006). 
However, consistent with Luginbuhl and Howe’s (1994) findings, the relevance (or lack thereof) 
of the VIS did not appear to have an effect on  participant-jurors’ sentencing decisions in our 
study, nor did it influence their perceived weight of importance of aggravating and mitigating 
evidence.  
Because we observed virtually no differences between judicial instruction conditions, our 
findings--in combination with previous literature--suggest a pressing need for judicial 
instructional improvement in capital cases. During the sentencing phase of a capital trial and 
following instruction, jurors collectively possess the discretion to determine what is sufficient 
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mitigating and aggravating evidence in addition to what the appropriate burden of proof should 
be. In their study, Luginbuhl and Howe’s (1994) found that only one third of jurors understood 
“that a sentence of life is required if the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors” 
despite being given VIE specific instructions (p. 1180). The capacity for jurors to misinterpret 
the law at various stages of a trial is immense and equally alarming (​Luginbuhl & Howe, 1994)​. 
Such arbitrariness of judicial instructions can effectively sentence a defendant to certain death 
even before the sentence is rendered. In combination with our results, these findings suggest that 
VIE specific instructions should indeed be implemented in capital cases, however jurors may not 
be achieving maximum comprehension of the instructions they are presented with. Though we 
did not measure participants’ comprehension of the judicial instructions, perhaps subsequent 
research studies can dissect the most critical concepts within standard VIE instructions and 
empirically examine which ideas are most often misunderstood, thus providing legal experts with 
a focal point for improvement regarding comprehension.  
 Our third hypothesis was that participants who were in the ‘Crime Scene Photo’ and 
‘Family Photo’ groups would display higher levels of memory distortion regarding case details 
presented in the trial transcript than participants in the ‘Control’ group. We found no evidence to 
support this hypothesis; indeed, our participants were able to recall details about the case quite 
accurately overall. Our failure to find an effect may lie in the poor internal consistency of the 
memory questions that were asked, which will be further discussed in the limitations.  
Lastly, we hypothesized that participants who reported higher levels of anger 
immediately following exposure to the victim impact evidence would report higher levels of 
confidence in their verdict decisions as well. Our results did not reach statistical significance, 
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however they are not to be entirely disregarded. We observed a trend that increased levels of 
anger was predictive of higher levels of confidence to some extent. Recall that researchers 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) argued that when jurors experience anger, they are more likely to rely 
on information heuristically, thus causing them to feel more certain/confident about their 
gut-level decisions. Though participants sentenced the defendant to death and LIWP relatively 
equally, we can suggest that participants who did experience increased levels in anger felt more 
confident about their decisions (regardless of the decision itself).  
Limitations 
First and foremost, it is important to note that victim impact statements are typically 
given by the victims/survivors themselves, in person. The jury is able to look the victim(s) in the 
eye as they deliver their harrowing statements of anguish and pain (often with the defendant in 
the courtroom as well). Because this was our first attempt to investigate this issue, we made the 
conscious decision to minimize potential confounds by using a textual victim impact statement 
as opposed to showing a videotaped testimony or constructing a mock jury trial. In doing so, we 
sought to gain insight about the emotional/cognitive effects that victim impact statements could 
have on jurors, while allowing for enough emotional variance between imagery and judicial 
instruction conditions. As detailed in the literature review, the administration of victim impact 
statements in actual court proceedings consistently elicit acute, negative emotions in jurors. 
Because we were examining the ​combined​ effects of VIS and imagery on jurors, we did not want 
to evoke such strong emotions for all conditions and draw erroneous conclusions regarding 
where the emotions were stemming from. Unfortunately, our results suggest that using a textual 
VIS may not have captured the genuine emotionality of such testimonies, which is perhaps why 
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we did not achieve significance. Thus, we cannot conclude that our manipulations have no effect; 
they just appear to have no effect when combined with textual statements. 
In the same vein, we did not have a control group that was given the trial transcript 
without a VIS. Having a control group who was not privy to the VIS could have allowed us to 
establish an emotional baseline, thus yielding more robust implications of jurors’ perceptions of 
VIS as aggravating evidence and whether they led to increased levels of anger. To address these 
drawbacks in future studies, researchers might benefit from establishing a control group that is 
not presented with a victim impact statement and photographic evidence in addition to using a 
videotaped or in-person VIS.  
In regards to ecological validity, certain aspects of our study were noticeably different 
from authentic capital case proceedings. For example, our participants completed the study on 
the computer and in the comfort of their prefered environments. This limitation in the context of 
empirical research is not particularly concerning because as previously stated, research has found 
that varying methodologies (i.e., online vs. mock jury studies) do not yield significantly different 
results (Bornstein, 1999). However, what ​is ​concerning is that courts have been rather 
contemptuous toward implementing modifications based on psycholegal research whose 
methodologies are not representative of the actual legal process. When conducting jury research, 
Diamond (1997) suggests creating a study in two stages; “Stage One” should be performed on an 
easy-access sample (i.e., college students or online sample), while “Stage Two” should be 
performed on participants who are more representative of an authentic jury. The results are 
therefore more comparable to one another, while using the foundation of empirical 
methodologies and applying them to procedures that are more acceptable in court. Using this 
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model, the present study could be considered “Stage One” of a two-part study.  
Similar to in ​Nuñez et al.’s (2017) limitations,​ our participants were not asked to decide 
the defendant’s guilt, nor were they given the opportunity to deliberate with one another and 
agree on a final sentence. Considering we were primarily focused on the penalty phase of the 
trial, we wanted to avoid adding substantial amounts of time to the study, however in doing so 
we may have sacrificed the influence of these factors on our participants’ sentencing decisions. 
For example, the uniqueness of jury group dynamics can partially be attributed to the 
requirement of a unanimous decision by a group of twelve strangers. Perhaps more passive 
individuals would rather have the group decide which verdict/sentence is appropriate in an 
attempt to avoid conflict. By not allowing our participants to deliberate on a verdict/sentence, we 
effectively empowered each individual to make the sole decision of sentencing someone to 
LIWP or death. For the purpose of future VIE advocacy, succeeding studies may benefit from 
permitting their participants to engage in deliberation and coming to a unanimous decision.  
Lastly, the memory test that was given to participants at two times during the study (Day 
1 and Day 2) reported extremely low internal consistency. Essentially, our lack of internal 
consistency means that participants answered our memory recall questions uniformly correctly. 
Therefore, because participants were able to demonstrate accurate recollection of case details, 
further analysis into participants’ memory distortion as a result of emotional stimulation would 
be moot. For example, the memory question items included, “How much money did Anthony 
Prentice [the defendant] steal from Jeff Mason [the victim]?”; “What was the defendant’s IQ?”; 
and “How many children did Jeff Mason have?” Overall, participants answered these 
multiple-choice questions correctly over 75% of the time. The questions that were asked in this 
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study were not pilot tested and thus the test for recall may not have been difficult enough to lead 
to implications regarding memory distortion. Perhaps, future studies could use open-ended 
questions/free-recall to test for memory distortion, as in actual court proceedings, jurors are not 
presented with alternative options to confirm their recollection of case details. Furthermore, by 
addressing the above limitation of permitting participants to engage in deliberation prior to 
rendering a sentence, implications regarding source monitoring errors may come to light. As 
mentioned in the literature review Segovia, Strange, and Takarangi, (2016) have argued that 
post-information processing (i.e., the discussion of varying perceptions and opinions during jury 
deliberation) may indeed lead to memory distortion implications.  
Future Research 
Considering our limitations and previous research on the admissibility/effects of victim 
impact evidence in capital cases, subsequent research studies can certainly expand upon our 
results and implications. Indeed, we must reiterate the importance of court advocacy that is 
substantiated in empirical research. Future studies should aim to examine the combined effects of 
VIE systematically (perhaps in a “Stage One” study) while preserving the ecological validity that 
is of utmost importance to the Court. Elaboration on the tendency for jurors to misinterpret the 
importance of objectively weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence prior to rendering a 
death sentence is crucial. Though we did not obtain significant findings regarding the effects of 
memory distortion on sentencing decisions, previous research surrounding this topic warrants 
further investigation into whether it does in fact play a role in capital cases.  
As previously mentioned, in realistic capital cases, the jury that sentences the defendant 
during the penalty phase is in fact the same jury that previously finds the defendant guilty or 
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innocent. In a follow-up study, researchers may consider having mock jurors participate in the 
guilt phase of the capital trial in addition to the penalty phase. Conducting studies that align more 
closely with the capital trial jury process (such as a mock jury) may allow for more robust 
implications regarding memory distortion, the combined effects of varying types of victim 
impact evidence, and ultimate change in legislature.  
In conclusion, research pertaining to the combined effects of varying types of VIE will 
benefit fields such as cognitive psychology, emotion psychology, and legal scholarship. 
Hopefully this study in addition to future studies that expand on these issues will ultimately 
provide critical evidence as jurisdictions consider the role of emotion evidence in sentencing 
decisions.   
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Appendix A 
Judicial Instruction for Victim Impact Evidence​ ​as Presented in the Trial Transcript 
  
 THE COURT: I will now instruct you as to the law. Number            
one, the law that applies to the case is stated in these            
instructions. And it is your duty to follow all of them. You must not              
single out certain instructions and disregard others. Neither        
sympathy nor prejudice should influence you. The evidence you should          
consider consists only of the testimony of the witnesses. You should           
consider all the evidence in the light of your own observations and            
experience in life. Faithful performance by you of your duties as           
jurors is vital to the administration of justice. The defendant has           
been found guilty of the offense of murder. According to the law of             
the state, he will be put to death or imprisoned for life. Only you              
can determine which. The defendant will be sentenced to death if you            
find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more statutory aggravating           
factors exist, and that no mitigating factor or factors exist          
sufficient to preclude the death penalty. 
Number two, first let me describe the statutory aggravating         
factors. Before the defendant can be sentenced to death, you must           
find without a reasonable doubt that the murdered individual was          
killed in the course of another felony, and 
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A) the murdered individual was actually killed by the         
defendant and not by another party to the crime, or simply as a             
consequence to the crime and 
B) the defendant killed the murdered individual intentionally        
or with the knowledge that the acts which cause the death           
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to           
the murdered individual and 
C) the other felony was one of the following: armed robbery or            
robbery. 
 
Aggravating factors are those facts or circumstances which        
provide reasons for imposing the death penalty. Aggravating factors         
include, but need not be limited to, the required statutory          
aggravating factors regarding which you’re instructed in instruction        
number two. 
Mitigating factors are any facts or circumstances that provide         
reasons for imposing a sentence less than the death penalty.          
Mitigating factors may include that 
1) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the           
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although        
not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or 
2) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant’s          
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act, or 
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3) the defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful          
citizenship, or 
4) any other facts or circumstances that provide reasons for          
imposing less than the death penalty.  
 
If you determine that there is no mitigating factor or factors           
sufficient to keep the death sentence from being imposed, check that           
box on the verdict form which states that there is no mitigating            
factor or factors sufficient to conclude the imposition of the death           
sentence on the defendant. If you check this box, the court must            
sentence the defendant to death. If you determine that there is a            
mitigating factor or factors sufficient to conclude the imposition of          
the death sentence, check that box on the verdict form indicating           
this decision. 
Additionally, during the course of this proceeding, you have         
heard evidence which pertains to the personal characteristics of the          
victim, and you have heard evidence which pertains to the impact of            
the victim’s death on her family and community. This evidence is           
referred to as victim impact evidence and is intended to show each            
victim’s uniqueness as a human being and the impact of her loss upon             
her family. This evidence should be given whatever weight you feel it            
deserves, in accordance with the law and pursuant to my instructions           
in determining whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment          
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without parole or death. I instruct you, however, that victim impact           
evidence can never serve as the basis for making a defendant eligible            
for the death penalty. This evidence is not to be considered by you             
as an aggravating circumstance – as a reason to impose the death            
penalty. No matter how emotionally compelling you have found this          
evidence to be, you are instructed that you may not consider evidence            
concerning the personal characteristics or impact of the victim’s         
death on her family or community during the weighing of aggravating           
and mitigating circumstances. When weighing aggravating and       
mitigating circumstances you may only consider those aggravating        
circumstances, if any, which you have unanimously found proven beyond          
a reasonable doubt, and those mitigating circumstances, if any, which          
you have found proven by preponderance of the evidence. During this           
process, you may not consider any evidence which pertains to the           
personal characteristics or the impact of the victim’s death on her           
family or community. If you determine that the mitigating         
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then you will        
enter a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. It is only in            
accordance with these instructions that you may consider victim         
impact evidence in your determination of the appropriate sentence in          
this case. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I now ask you to retire and consider all            
of the evidence and the instructions which I have read for you, which             
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govern the law, and please come to a verdict. Thank you. 
  
 
 
Appendix B  
 
Victim Impact Statement  
  
Q.​  Please  give  your  name  for  the  court  and  explain  your  relationship  to  the  victim. 
  
A.​  My  name  is  Daphne  Mason,  Jeff  was  my  husband.  
 
Q. ​ Please  tell  the  court  how  you  learned  of  your  husband’s  murder. 
  
A.​  I  was  at  home  watching  the  kids.  We  have  two  little  ones—Janie,  who  is  3  and 
Max,  who  is  4. They  were  in  the  next  room  playing  with  their  toys  when  I  got  a  call 
from  my  neighbor  Stephanie.  She  told  me  to  sit  down,  and  then  she  said  that  there  had 
been  a  robbery  at  the  store  and  someone  was  shot.  I  asked  her  to  come  over  and  watch 
the  kids  and  the  next  thing  I  remember  is  she  was  at  my  door.  I  drove  to  the  store  as 
fast  as  I  could,  but  then  I  pulled  over  to  the  side  of  the  road  when  I  remembered  that  I 
could  call  him  on  his  cell  phone.  I  knew  he  wouldn’t  answer  but  I  just  had  to  try.  The 
phone  just  rang  and  rang  and  went  to  voicemail.  I  got  back  on  the  road  and  drove  to 
the  store.  A  policeman  came  over  to  the  car  and  I  told  him  my  husband  worked  there. 
He  asked  me  if  my  husband  was  Jeff  Mason.  That  is  when  I  knew  my  husband  was 
dead.  
 
Q.  ​I’m  sorry  Mrs.  Mason,  I  realize  this  is  hard  to  talk  about.  If  you  can,  could  you  tell 
the  court  how  losing  your  husband  has  impacted  you  and  your  family?  
 
A.  I  can’t  possibly  convey,  in  full  detail,  how  this  has  impacted  my  family  and  me. 
There  is  not  a  day  that  has  gone  by  since  Jeff  was  murdered  that  I  have  not  thought 
about  that  day  or  about  him  in  some  capacity.  It  may  begin  with  happy  memories,  such 
as  the  times  we  spent  New  Year’s  Eve  together,  or  our  vacations.  But,  those  good 
memories  only  lead  to  memories  of  the  day  he  was  killed.  I  wonder  how  he  felt  as  he 
was  attacked  and  murdered.  I  imagine  his  face  and  the  look  in  his  eyes  as  he  took  his 
last  breaths.  I  think  about  the  fear  he  must  have  experienced,  and  the  pain,  how  he 
suffered,  and  I  am  filled  with  anger  and  hate  for  Anthony  Prentice. Anthony  Prentice 
took  it  upon  himself  to  act  as  my  husband’s  judge,  jury,  and  executioner.  Jeff  didn’t  get 
the  chance  to  have  a  jury  to  decide  his  fate.  Instead,  Mr.  Prentice  did  it  for  him.    Since 
Mr.  Prentice  killed  my  husband,  my  entire  life  has  changed.  You  cannot  imagine  the 
hell  that  he  has  caused  for  our  entire  family.  We  were  just  kids  when  we  first  met.  Jeff 
has  been  everything  to  me  practically  my  whole  life.  If  something  good  happens  in  my 
day  I  don’t  have  him  to  share  it  with.  He  was  just  a  young  man.  Taking  a  person’s  life 
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at  such  a  young  age  is  just  so  unfair.  Anthony  Prentice  didn’t  have  to  kill  him.  Jeff 
was  already  beaten  and  he  was  not  fighting  back.  Mr.  Prentice  didn’t  need  to  point  the 
gun  in  his  face  and  blow  a  hole  in  his  head.  What  gives  him  the  right  to  take  a 
person’s  life  like  that?  Jeff  doesn’t  get  to  grow  old  and  watch  his  children  grow  up  and 
get  married.  Jeff  was  robbed  of  the  chance  to  live  and  experience  his  children  and 
family  because  of  that  man  sitting  at  the  defense  table.  It  makes  my  blood  boil  to  think 
that  I  have  been  robbed  of  the  most  important  person  in  my  world  because  this  man 
sitting  at  the  defense  table  figured  Jeff’s  life  didn’t  matter.  I  have  suffered  from  many 
health  problems,  including  depression  and  hypertension.  I  have  been  on  numerous 
medications.    There  are  no  words  to  tell  you  of  the  pain,  sorrow,  and  grief  that  this 
man  has  caused.  The  holidays  are  the  hardest  for  us.  It  was  in  December  when  he  was 
killed.  
 
Q. ​ Can  you  share  with  the  Court  how  the  family  is  impacted  by  your  husband’s 
murder?  
 
A.​  It’s  frustrating  because  we  can’t  move  forward  with  our  lives.  It’s—like  I—it’s 
just—I  don’t  know.  It’s  just  really  hard  to  put—put  into  words.  I  wish  I  could  just  put 
you  all  inside  of  myself  so  you  could  really  see  what  I  want  to  say,  ’cause  I  feel 
as—so  many  different  emotions.    I  wish  there  was  just  one  word  that  I  could  use  just 
to  tell  you  how  this  all—it’s  all  affected  us  you  know.  It’s  still  hard.  You  know,  it’s 
been—it’s  been  years,  but  today,  to  all  of  us,  that’s  not  a  long  time.    I  miss  my 
husband.  You  know,  he  didn’t  do  anything  wrong  to  anybody.  He  was  just  a  victim  of 
a  very  bad  circumstance  that  really—I  don’t  know.  He  fell  victim  to  something  that 
really  didn’t  have  to  have  anything  to  do  with  him.  He  was  only  31  years  old.  He 
didn’t  hurt  anybody.    And  because  of  somebody’s  selfishness,  he’s  gone.  Jeff  was  the 
best  father.  Janie  was  a  real  daddy’s  girl.  She  loved  to  get  up  on  his  lap  on  the  couch 
and  snuggle.  They’d  watch  cartoons  together.  Max  is  the  spitting  image  of  his  father. 
Every  time  I  look  at  him  I  see  his  dad.    Both  of  these  kids  have  to  grow  up  without 
their  father.  The  look  in  their  faces  when  I  told  them  their  father  was  dead  is  something 
I  cannot  forget.  I  know  now  nothing  I  ever  do  in  my  life  will  be  as  hard  as  that  was. 
The  kids  will  never  be  the  same.  Janie  needs  all  her  lights  on  and  still  she  takes 
forever  to  fall  asleep.  But  it’s  just—just  a  huge  gap.  You  know,  really,  like  I  said,  I 
look  at  my  kids  and  just  know—I  know  I’m  not  whole.  I  know  they’re  not  whole.  I 
just—you  got  to  excuse  me.  It’s  really  caused—it’s  really  hard  to  put,  really,  what  I  feel 
about  the  whole  situation.  I  feel  angry  and  empty  at  the  same  time.  That  man  robbed 
those  two  little  children  of  their  father.  They  don’t  get  to  grow  up  with  a  father.  Max 
doesn’t  get  to  have  his  father  pitch  the  ball  to  him.  It’s  such  a  waste.  None  of  our  lives 
will  ever  be  the  same  because    of  this  one  event.  Someday  I  am  going  to  have  to  tell 
them  how  Jeff  died.  They  don’t  know  he  was  murdered.  How  can  I  tell  them  that?  At 
what  age  is  it  ok  to  hear  that  your  dad  was  murdered  and  how  he  suffered  before  he 
died?  I  don’t  want  them  thinking  about  the  same  stuff  I  think  about  when  I  go  to  bed 
at  night.  
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Q. ​ Thank  you  Mrs.  Mason.
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